ユーザー向け情報

マイライブラリ
マイライブラリ

+ マイライブラリに追加

電話
24時間体制サポート | テクニカルサポート利用方法

お問い合わせ履歴

電話する

+7 (495) 789-45-86

Profile

Trojan.XPath.4

Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2019-09-19

Virus description added:

Packer: absent

Compilation dates:

  • 11.01.2018 12:14:28 (x86 version)
  • 11.01.2018 12:16:21 (x64 version)

SHA1 hashes:

  • fc4844a6f9b5c76abc1ec50b93597c5cfde46075 (x86)
  • 2bf5cfe30265a99c13f5adad7dd17ccb9db272e0 (x64)

Description

A multifunctional backdoor trojan for the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the Microsoft Windows operating systems. It is one of the components of the Trojan.XPath trojan family. It is used for granting unauthorized access to infected computers and performing various malicious actions upon attackers’ commands.

Trojan.XPath.4 is written in C++ and created using several open source projects. One of them is the Cyclone TCP library designed for low-level operation within the network. Malware creators modified it to use the WinDivert driver instead of the WinPcap driver. The second project is the modified libdsm library, which implements the operation through the SMB protocol.

Operating routine

The trojan reads and decrypts the configuration file from the Video or Scsi parameter stored in the [HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\LoginInfo] registry key. It then verifies if the first 4 bytes coincide with the 1E 5A CF 24 value and if the 16th bite equals 0xCE.

Next, Trojan.XPath.4 forms a unique HWID (Hardware ID) identifier of the infected device, based on its hardware configuration.

After that, it opens the device \\.\BainduHips to verify the network driver is available. Depending on the operating system version, any calls to the driver are performed in a specific way. The first one is executed in the Windows operating system versions, starting from Windows 2000 and ending with Windows Server 2003 R2 where the WinCap-based driver is used. The second one is executed on newer versions of Windows where the WinDivert-based driver is used.

In order to determine through which network interfaces the trojan should work, it searches for the network interfaces with types MIB_IF_TYPE_ETHERNET and IF_TYPE_IEEE80211, which are connected to the network. If Trojan.XPath.4 is running on a Windows version earlier than Windows Vista, it sends the IOCTL code 0x80000800 to its driver. After this IOCTL code is received, the driver installs its own hooks onto the handlers, which are responsible for various functions of the TCP/IP protocol.

Based on that, the trojan can operate in two modes. In the first mode, it functions as a client (Client Mode), connecting to the C&C server and waiting for the corresponding commands. In the second mode, the trojan operates as an agent (Agent Mode), listening to the specific ports, and waiting for other clients to connect and receive their corresponding commands. In this mode, Trojan.XPath.4 acts as a server.

Operation in the Agent (Server) Mode

While working with the network driver, Trojan.XPath.4 does not actually listen to or receive connections on a port. Instead, the driver listens for traffic on the network interface and sends filtered packets to the trojan. As a result, the port, to which the trojan listens, is not shown as opened anywhere.

Trojan.XPath.4 checks the current day of the week and the time set in the system settings and compares their values with the data from the configuration file. In this file, there is flag for each hour of each day of the week, which inform the trojan if it should run at that specific time. If there is no flag for the current time, the malware will not receive any packets.

Trojan.XPath.4 waits for an incoming packet of 32 bytes. Next, it takes the first 4 bytes as an XOR key to decrypt the remaining 28 bytes. The decryption algorithm is shown in the picture below:

#drweb

After decryption, it verifies bytes 4 through 12 and does not perform any further actions if these bytes match the string 1I2#aLeb. If this string is not present, the trojan attempts to decrypt the packet with the AES key instead of the XOR key. Next, the trojan verifies if the first 4 decrypted bytes match the string 7r#K. If there is no match, the trojan will determine an error has occurred, and all further packet processing will be stopped. But in case there is a match after decryption, this packet will have the following structure:


#pragma pack(push,1)
struct st_packet_header
{
_BYTE com_flag[4];
_DWORD packed_size;
_DWORD decomp_size;
_DWORD cmdid;
_BYTE pad[16];
};
#pragma pack(pop)

If the packed_size field has 32 value, and the decomp_size field has the value of 0, the trojan verifies if there is a tunnel to another bot created. If the tunnel exists, Trojan.XPath.4 redirects the command into it, so that the connected bot can execute it. If there is no tunnel, the trojan executes the command itself.

If the values of the field mentioned earlier are different from those the trojan expects, it will round off the size of the packed_size field to the larger value, multiple to 16, which represents the size of packet’s payload. After that, it receives the rest of the data, decrypts it with one of two AES keys and unpacks it with the LZMA algorithm. Next, it verifies if the size of the unpacked data matches the size presented in the decomp_size field of the st_packet_header packet. If the site match is confirmed, Trojan.XPath.4 sends the received command into the tunnel or executes it on its own if the tunnel was not created.

Operation in the Client Mode

The trojan will run in this mode if the configuration file contains the C&C server address and the operation mode 3, which corresponds to the Client Mode, is specified. The malware sample analyzed has a 4 mode specified, which corresponds to the Agent Mode.

The trojan generates a random port number within the range of 10000 ≤port_number≤ 65530 and connects to it.

Next, it forms the following packet:


#pragma pack(push,1)
struct st_hello
{
_DWORD key;
_BYTE magic[8]; // "1I2#aLeb
_DWORD packet_id; // 0x00
_DWORD dword14; // 0x00
_WORD port;
_BYTE byte16[10];
};
#pragma pack(pop)

In the port field it specifies the number of the previously generated port. Next, it takes the GetTickCount() value as an XOR key to decrypt the packet, and encrypts this value in its first 4 bytes. The trojan creates the socket, connects to the C&C server listed in the configuration file, sends the packet, and ends the connection. Upon receipt of this packet, the trojan driver will add IP:port from where the packet originates into the firewall exceptions.

Next, Trojan.XPath.4 connects to the same C&C server again, but this time, it uses the socket to which it was earlier connected through the random port. After that, Trojan.XPath.4 sends the packet TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGIN to the C&C server and waits for further commands (additional information about the commands is listed in the corresponding table of the “Commands list” section of this description). Reception and dispatch of the packets is executed in the same way as with the operation as a server (Agent (Server) Mode).

Packet dispatching

If the packet has any data, that data is packed with the LZMA algorithm. As a result, the following data structure is created:

  • The header in a form of the st_packet_header structure (this structure is described in the “Operation in the Agent (Server) Mode” section):
    
    #pragma pack(push,1)
    struct st_packet_header
    {
    _BYTE com_flag[4];
    _DWORD packed_size;
    _DWORD decomp_size;
    _DWORD cmdid;
    _BYTE pad[16];
    };
    #pragma pack(pop)
    
  • Compressed data

The resulting data, together with the header, is compressed with the first AES key and sent to the addressee. The only packet not compressed and encrypted with the AES key is the st_hello packet.

Commands list

Commands IDs Name of the command Resulting action
0x138A AGENT_SERVER_ALIVE Confirms the Agent-server operation
0x138D Allocates additional socket or execute the command stored in the packet’s data
0x138E AGENT_CLIENT_NEW_CONNECT_ACCEPT Enables additional connection with the Agent-server and executes the command
0x4E21 COMMAND_SERVER_ALIVE Confirms the C&C server operation
0x4E22 COMMAND_SERVER_CONNECT Sends the command to establish the connection with the C&C server
0x4E24 COMMAND_SERVER_NOTIFY_CLIENT Establishes additional connection with the C&C server and executes the command
0x4E25 Ends the connection
0x4E26 Updates the trojan driver and the modules
0x4E27 A command for the trojan to uninstall itself
0x4E28 COMMAND_SERVER_READY Checks if the server is ready
0x4E2A Ends the trojan process
0x4E34 Forces the computer to shutdown
0x4E35 Forces log out from the user’s computer account
0x4E36 Forces the computer to reboot
0x4E37 Powers off the computer
0x4E38 Forces log out from the user’s computer account
0x4E39 Reboots the computer
0x5014 COMMAND_SHELL_START Runs the Shell
0x5015 COMMAND_CMDDLG_OPENED Starts reading the data from the Shell
0x5016 Sends the data to the Shell
0x5017 COMMAND_SHELL_EXIT Closes the Shell
0x5078 COMMAND_TUNNEL_START Launches the plug-in creating the tunnel
0x5079 Sends the data to the C&C server that has a connected tunnel
0x507A Sets the C&C server address to which the tunnel will be created
0x507B COMMAND_TUNNEL_NEW_CONNECTION Creates the tunnel to the specified C&C server
0x507C Receives NetBios name of the specified IP address
0x5082 COMMAND_TUNNEL_EXIT Disables the tunnel
0x5E30 COMMAND_FILE_START Runs file manager
0x5E31 Directory listing
0x5E32 Reads the file from the specified offset
0x5E33 Creates the file
0x5E34 Writes into the file from the specified offset
0x5E36 Reads the file from the specified offset
0x5E37 Transfers an empty packet with the 0x98BC code to the C&C server
0x5E38 Deletes the specified file
0x5E39 Recursively deletes the specified directory or files
0x5E40 Obtains the file size
0x5E41 Creates the folder
0x5E42 Moves the file
0x5E43 Runs the file with the window
0x5E44 Runs the file without a window
0x5E45 Ignored
0x5E46 Ignored
0x5E47 Receives the data about the file (creation and modification time, access information, file size, file type, the name of the app that can be used to open this file)
0x5E49 Sets file attributes specified in the command
0x5E51 Disables the file manager
0x5E52 Recursively lists the specified directory
0x891C TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGIN Client authorization on the server
0xEA66 PUBLIC_ACTIVE Set public_active flag

Artifacts

The trojan file contains traces of debugging information that reveals the names of the following source code files:

  ..\\common\\LzmaLib.c
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\ringqueue.h
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\untils.h
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\ShellManager.h
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\file.h
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\tunnel.h
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\network.h
  z:\\desk_codes\\project_xpath\\xpath\\clientmode.h
  xPathMain.c
  cyclone_tcp\\core\\bsd_socket.c
  

The original functions names:

  SendClientMagic
  FindPluginData
  DeCompressData
  GetSockInfo nocase
  StartShell
  UnInitShell
  UnInitFileManager
  recv_pack2
  x_gethostbyname
  OutputData
  tcpF
  WorkThread
  alloc_new_si
  x_decompress
  

The original commands names:

  COMMAND_FILE_START
  PUBLIC_ACTIVE
  COMMAND_TUNNEL_EXIT
  COMMAND_TUNNEL_NEW_CONNECTION
  COMMAND_SERVER_READY
  AGENT_SERVER_ALIVE
  COMMAND_SERVER_CONNECT
  TOKEN_CLIENT_CONNECT
  AGENT_SERVER_ALIVE
  COMMAND_SERVER_ALIVE
  COMMAND_SERVER_NOTIFY_CLIENT
  AGENT_CLIENT_NEW_CONNECT_ACCEPT
  COMMAND_SHELL_START
  COMMAND_TUNNEL_START
  COMMAND_CMDDLG_OPENED
  COMMAND_SHELL_EXIT
  COMMAND_TUNNEL_EXIT
  TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGIN

Various debugging messages:

    get conf,agent:%d,client:%d,interval:%d,listen1:%d,addr1:%s:%d \n
    os init:%d-%d-%d bGetConfig:%d %d\tver:%10d\n
    ver:%d remote:%d listen:%d\n
    x_decompress bad in tcpR,socket:%d token:%d len:%d,target len:%d,%d\n
    dir: %ws,%ws,%ws,%d,%d,%d
    file: %ws,%ws,%ws,%d,%d,%d
    tunnel connect error :%x--%d,%d,%d\n
    init get ip:%s,%s,%s,%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x,%s\n
    ready accept port of client to agent:%d,local: %x--%d\n
    stack set ip:%s mask:%s gw:%s
    baidu_tx_web%d
    stack add ip:%s mask:%s gw:%s
    agent must with driver\n
    current if:%d\n
    the connect thread is ending.....\n
    the sub connect thread is ending.....\n
    listen thread1 out\n
    client unknown token %d\n
    errorrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr:%d,%d,%d\n
    tcp reverse decrypt error\n
    tcp reverse com flag error\n
    %04d %02d %02d-%02d:%02d:%02d :
    update alloc memory false\n
    update depack false,%d,%d,%d\n
    create update driver error\n
    alloc driver memory error,%d\n
    depack driver error\n
    write driver error\n
    client type wrong:%d,%d,%d
  

Curing recommendations

  1. If the operating system (OS) can be loaded (either normally or in safe mode), download Dr.Web Security Space and run a full scan of your computer and removable media you use. More about Dr.Web Security Space.
  2. If you cannot boot the OS, change the BIOS settings to boot your system from a CD or USB drive. Download the image of the emergency system repair disk Dr.Web® LiveDisk , mount it on a USB drive or burn it to a CD/DVD. After booting up with this media, run a full scan and cure all the detected threats.
Download Dr.Web

Download by serial number

Use Dr.Web Anti-virus for macOS to run a full scan of your Mac.

After booting up, run a full scan of all disk partitions with Dr.Web Anti-virus for Linux.

Download Dr.Web

Download by serial number

  1. If the mobile device is operating normally, download and install Dr.Web for Android. Run a full system scan and follow recommendations to neutralize the detected threats.
  2. If the mobile device has been locked by Android.Locker ransomware (the message on the screen tells you that you have broken some law or demands a set ransom amount; or you will see some other announcement that prevents you from using the handheld normally), do the following:
    • Load your smartphone or tablet in the safe mode (depending on the operating system version and specifications of the particular mobile device involved, this procedure can be performed in various ways; seek clarification from the user guide that was shipped with the device, or contact its manufacturer);
    • Once you have activated safe mode, install the Dr.Web for Android onto the infected handheld and run a full scan of the system; follow the steps recommended for neutralizing the threats that have been detected;
    • Switch off your device and turn it on as normal.

Find out more about Dr.Web for Android

ロシアに本社を置く、『Dr.Webアンチウイルスソフトウェア』のデベロッパーです。
1992年に製品の開発をスタートしました。
Dr.Webは世界200ヶ国以上のユーザーに利用されています。
2007 年、アンチウウイルスサービス(SaaS)の提供が開始しました。
24時間体制サポート

Dr.Web © Doctor Web
2003 — 2021

Doctor Webは、ロシアに本社を置く、『Dr.Webアンチウイルスソフトウェア』のデベロッパーです。その製品の開発は1992年に始まりました。

株式会社Doctor Web Pacific 〒105-0003 東京都港区西新橋1-14-10 西新橋スタービル 2F